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Dispite the diversity in definitions of “pistis,” Mirhady and Too’s translation of Isocrates’ Encomium of Helen and Busiris defines the term as both “argument” and “basis for argument.”[1] The argument under consideration does not necessarily have to be a tangible claim, but can actually be an indefinite argument theme. Mirhady and Too also explain that pistis can also be translated as faith or proof.[2] Faith, proof, and argument are not words considered to have especially common meanings, but they are all tied together by the importance of conviction, and the role conviction plays in people’s principles and reception to persuasion.
Plato used pistis in a few different ways, but one of them that must be considered was as “a strong argument or proof for the immortality of the soul or the existence of gods.”[3] This has lead pistis to have common consideration in Christian doctrine through the New Testament. The Greek-English dictionary lists pistis as a “faith credit argument.” In book six of Plato’s Republic, he discusses a “divided line” that establishes an epistemological, metaphysical hierarchy. The second lowest level of this line consists of beliefs, which Plato also labels as pistis.[4] He discusses how this pistis (belief) exists in the world of becoming, and is therefore a spiritual reality, not a tangible, physical reality.
Though pistis has several levels of definitions and residence in several parts of history, it most commonly appears in contemporary rhetorical pedagogy as a type of argument. Pistis is often viewed as the result of argument, as a conviction involving trust and engagement that comes as a response to an appropriate argument.[5] However, its links to more than one definitive term in today’s English is still worth considering. As Carver (2004) states, “pistis can be rightly translated as proof, argument, reasoning, persuasion, belief, trust, faith, conviction, obligation and confidence.”[6] Being able to find and understand the connections between the different meanings of pistis give it a particular power in rhetorical studies. While most of pistis’ definitions involve argument and argument effects, it should be interesting to note that pistis also translates into Lithuanian as the word “fuck.” Now there’s an excavation for outside of class…
[1] Mirhady, D. C. & Too, Y. L. (2000 Translation) Isocrates. University of Texas Press. pp. 37 & 58.
[2] Mirhady, D. C. & Too, Y. L. pp. 267.
[3] Hay, D. M. (1989). Pistis as “ground for faith” in Hellenized Judaism and Paul. The Journal of Biblical Literature, 108/3: p. 462.
[4] Dombrowski, D. (2006). Rethinking the ontological argument: A neoclassical theistic response. pp. 8.
[5] Smith, P. C. (1998). The Hermeneutics of original argument: demonstration, dialectic and rhetoric.
[6] Carver, E. (2004) For the sake of argument: practical reasoning, character and the ethics of belief. pp. 3.
3 comments:
I think it is interesting whenever a term survives for thousands of years with relatively unchanged meaning. Perhaps this happens because it is infrequently used, especially in common parlance. I have studied argumentation and persuasion in one form or another for about 10 years, and this is the first time I have encountered this word. I guess it stands to reason that the less a word escapes people's lips, the less chance it has to shift meaning.
Anyway, this excavation does a nice job bringing to the surface the myriad of terms / concepts involved in argumentation. Good work.
-neal
Aristotle quite possibly popularized the rhetorical definition of pistis as basis for argument with his emphasis on proofs as rhetoric’s primary method of persuasion. One of the major concepts of Aristotle’s rhetorical theory as outlined in “On Rhetoric” is the entechnic pisteis, or artistic proofs, we are all familiar with - ethos, pathos and logos. Aristotle goes into great detail about how to use these proofs as tools for persuasion, as well as specific instructions about the use of non-artistic proofs. In fact, the bulk of “On Rhetoric” is Book 2, titled “Pisteis.” (In Kennedy’s translation, pistis and pisteis are used interchangeably.)
According to your excavation, even with the prominence of Aristotle’s proofs, other facets of the definition of pistis have survived. Not to imply too much similarity between their respective rhetorical theories, I find it interesting that Plato and Aristotle used the same term in such different ways.
I think the movement of pistis from faith to argument is fitting especially when applied to contemporary religion. Elements of religion are quickly becoming a competition. Churches (primarily mega-churches) boast of their congregation size and how large their sanctuary is as an argument that their church is better than the one down the street. Religions spend just as much time demonizing the “other” as they do worshipping their own god. For many people religion is not about faith but about arguing how they are better than others.
Your observation that that pistis has to do with conviction is completely right. In Persuasion we learn that one of the best ways to change people’s conviction is through a change in their beliefs and attitudes. So I guess in a broad sense stronger arguments can alter an individual’s pistis which will in turn change their beliefs and affect the level of conviction they have on an issue. Pistis should be seen in Persuasion research as an important form of communication.
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